EMU governance: sometimes it is better to say less….

by Daniela Schwarzer

Last Monday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy once again pushed for an old French idea, the "gouvernement économique" for the Eurozone. In his speech in front of the European Parliament, the acting EU Council President reinterated the French quest that the governance structures of the European Monetary Union should be strengthened in order to allow for more politics in the management of the Eurozone economy.

ECB’s U-turn cannot repair the political damage done

by Sebastian Dullien

Only three months after its last rate hike, the ECB has yesterday prepared verbally for a sharp turnaround.  In contrast to former press conferences, President Jean-Claude Trichet stated that it is now clear that “economic activity in the euro area is weakening, with contracting domestic demand and tighter financing conditions.” According to him, “upside risks to price stability have diminished somewhat”, even if “they have not disappeared”. Importantly, the phrase that the “current monetary stance will contribute to achieving our objective” has been missing from the statements. Most observers read these changes in wording as a signal for an imminent rate cut, possibly as early as November with more cuts following until next spring (see for a good analysis Aurelio Maccario on RGE monitor ).

Recession in EMU: Not if, but how long is the question

by Sebastian Dullien

This week, there were a number of new indicators that the euro area actually might already be in recession: For July, Eurostat reported another drop in industrial production and revised prior months' data downwards, leaving the July figure now 1.1 percent below the figure for Q2. Moreover, the unemployment rate has already increased by 0.2 percent in the second quarter and surveys point to increasing plans by the private sector to shed jobs over the coming months.

How mislead was the ECB’s July hike?

by Sebastian Dullien

Internationally, there was quite a lot of controversy about the ECB's hike in July. The Munich ifo institute hence asked a handful of German experts in their latest ifo-Schnelldienst for their assessment, among others me. I was happy to contribute.

Last week, the issue was published and I was a little surprised to read that I was the only one really criticising the step. Jörg Krämer from the Commerzbank, Ulrich Kater from the Dekabank and Werner Becker from the Deutsche Bank - while not all enthusiastic about the interest rate hike - were at least to a certain extent justifying the rate increase. I, in contrast, strongly criticised this step, as I had done earlier on Eurozone Watch ( here and here ).

Germany on the verge of recession: Why are politicians so far behind the curve again?

by Sebastian Dullien

Today's data releases have shown that the state of the German economy is worse than even the pessimists have thought so far. Details from Q2 GDP data revealed that there were fundamental rather than merely technical factors behind the siginificant drop of GDP in the second quarter (0.5 percent quarter-on-quarter or 2.0 percent in annualized terms). Even taking out the drop in construction activity (which was a technical reaction to an extremely strong increase in Q1) and the inventory correction, economic growth basically came to a standstill this spring. Private consumption has now been contracting three quarters in a row and investment in equipment and software contracted sharply (possibly as a side effect of the corporate tax reform which was enacted on January 1 as has been criticised on Eurozone watch for its contractionary effects before - see here and here ).

The implications of Ireland’s “No” for France’s EU Presidency

by Daniela Schwarzer

This is a slightly extended and updated English version of an op-ed I published in the Financial Times Deutschland on July 24, 2008. A more detailed analysis of the implications of the Irish “No” for the French Presidency was published on Eurointelligence.

4th part of our series on the EU after the Irish No to the Lisbon Treaty   

The Irish „No“ to the Lisbon-Treaty is more problematic for the French EU-Presidency than Sarkozy’s previous comments would suggest. This, at least, the French President’s visit to Dublin last Monday has shown. His trip was widely deemed a success – although perhaps only because he desisted from stirring up further tensions with the Irish. At best, he may even have calmed Irish anger over the remarks he made last week regarding the likelihood of a second Irish referendum.

European Business Confidence in Free Fall: Thank you Mr. Trichet?

by Sebastian Dullien

The global downturn has now hit Europe with its full force. Today, not only PMIs fell across the euro-zone. Also the German ifo-index took a bad hit, experiencing the largest one-month-drop since the recession of 2001. Both the expectations as well as the current conditions index dropped sharply. The expectations component is now not far away from levels seen during the last recessions.

Suddenly, even the German economy does not look as resilient any more as it was long claimed by some observers (see my post here on false complacency concerning the strong euro). Nevertheless, Germany still looks strong compared to the rest of Europe: According to the PMI surveys, the German manufacturing sector is merely stagnating while the sector in most of the rest of Europe already is in recession.

Economic outlook is clouding: Recession call for Ireland and Spain, Germany slowing sharply

by Sebastian Dullien

3rd part of our series on the EU after the Irish No to the Lisbon Treaty   

The economic outlook for the euro area is deteriorating fast: This week has brought a number of new indicators pointing at a sharp slow-down ahead. Not only are signs mounting that the first countries on the fringe of the euro area such as Ireland and Spain may now be in recession, but there are now also some first indications that Germany, long seen as the most robust economy of the euro area at the moment, is also heading for a significant slowdown. Negotiations on an new protocol to complement the Lisbon Treaty or on a revised version of the Treaty will hence take place in a difficult economic setting. This could turn out to be particularly problematic for Ireland, which may face a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

Opening up the Lisbon Treaty for new negotiations?

by Daniela Schwarzer

2nd part of our series on the EU after the Irish No to the Lisbon Treaty   

The European Council on June 19/20, 2008 did not indicate a way out of the EU crisis which resurfaced with the Irish „No“ to the Lisbon Treaty on June 12, 2008. Nevertheless, one or two likely options are being sketched on the horizon.

Option one is to provide Ireland with a protocol to the Lisbon Treaty, which takes into account Ireland’s most important problems with the Treaty and possibly grants certain opt-outs of community policies. We discussed this scenario, which seems to have the largest support among EU member states at the moment here , explaining why the double-Nice-referendum of 2001/2002 cannot simply be repeated.

Another protocol for Ireland?

by Daniela Schwarzer

1st part of our series on the EU after the Irish No to the Lisbon Treaty   

The European Council on June 19/20, 2008 did not indicate a way out of the EU crisis which resurfaced with the Irish „No“ to the Lisbon Treaty on June 12, 2008. But before and during the European summit, one “most likely” scenario emerged. The majority of member governments seemed to agree that the ratification process should be completed as far as possible – in order to get a clearer picture which governments or countries actually back or do not back the Treaty, and foremost, to put pressure on Ireland to negotiate some add-on to the Treaty and ratify it soon afterwards.

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