February 6, 2009
On the rise: The euro’s attraction for non-EMU members
Third part of our series on the winners and losers of the current crisis
Despite certain doubts about the Eurozone's ability to tackle the crisis, the attraction of the Euro as a "safe haven" in an era of turbulence has risen considerably for the non-participating EU countries. Even the UK and Denmark, which have negotiated an Opt-Out in the Maastricht Treaty, debate a possible EMU membership.
Yet, British entry into the EMU is unlikely for at least the next five to ten years. Despite the revived debate in the UK, there is currently no political majority (or even powerful enough minority) which could turn around the skeptical public mood about EMU entry, especially given the influential (tabloid) press which runs anti-EMU campaigns. If Labour should lose its governing majority in the House of Commons in the next general elections to be held at the latest in early June 2010, a preparation of a British entry into the EMU will be highly unlikely during the next Parliamentary term which can run up to 2015.
The situation is different in Denmark. The Eurozone's northern neighbor experienced capital outflows in October 2008 which forced the central bank to interest rates to 5.5 % in order to keep the exchange rate stable. Previously, the Danish Central Bank had roughly followed the ECB-interest rate policy and has participated in the EMS II. Under the impression of market turbulences and concerns about the stability of the national banking sector, public opinion has turned positive on EMU membership. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is considering to hold a referendum on Danish EMU membership soon, but seeks to ensure broad political support for this endeavor, including the eurosceptical Danish People Party, a minority party which supports his government. recently made a strong case for joining the euro when he pointed out both the economic and the political advantages of EMU membership in a hearing in front of the Danish Parliament.
Also in Sweden, which did not negotiate an Opt-Out to the Treaty but has opted for not fulfilling the convergence criteria for political reasons, discussions develop on a possible change of strategy with regard to EMU membership. However, there is no clear political move as in Denmark. Most major political parties in Sweden, including the governing Alliance for Sweden (except for the Centre Party), and the former governing Social Democrats, support introducing the Euro. But the negative referendum on EMU membership held in 2003 (56 % No-votes) still strongly weighs on those forces which support EMU membership even though public opinion on EMU membership has improved since May 2008 as a regularly conducted poll by the Swedish Statistics Office reveals ). Further market turbulence and speculation against the Crona may lead to a situation in which the cost-benefit-analysis with regard to an EMU membership might change, especially if Denmark (and the Baltic states) head towards EMU membership. EMU membership may well become an issue in the next general elections to be held at the latest in 2010.
Central and Eastern Europe
In 2007, Poland openly questioned its EMU membership perspective and the Kaczynski-government at the time announced a referendum on EMU membership which would have been incompatible with the EU Treaty. Under the impression of the crisis, the government of Prime Minister Tusk seeks to join the EMU until 2012 and wants to become a member of the EMS II in June 2009. A strong devaluation of the Zloty has caused concern in Poland whether pressure on the Polish currency and the Polish financial markets could increase. Also the Czech Republic and Hungary have recently abandoned their EMU-skeptical stance. Similar to the Baltic States, which seem to seek EMU membership as early as 2011, these two countries have increased their preparation in order to be ready for a convergence test soon. In most Central and Eastern European member states the benefits of an EMU membership under the impression of the financial market and economic crisis, suddenly seem to clearly outweigh the maintenance of the national currency and the national monetary and exchange rate policy. EMU promises lower interest rates, lower risk premiums (which currently price-in the risks of devaluation for the Central and Eastern European currencies) and more stability due to lower exchange rate fluctuations and higher credibility for the national banking sectors. Especially the fact that Slovakia (which became an EMU member on January 1, 2009) has experienced lower pressure from the financial markets than the other Central and Eastern European member states, has led to increased interest of those member states in the EMU.
Not necessarily more speed for EMU enlargement
These developments yet do not automatically imply that the Eastern enlargement of the European Monetary Union will speed up. The lower interest rates and the reduced commodity prices have a positive effect on lower inflation in the candidate countries and make monetary convergence easier to obtain. But fiscal convergence and the need to stabilize exchange rates vis-à-vis the Euro turn out to be more difficult. Meanwhile, a softening of the convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty is unlikely. The reason is not only that the EC-Treaty is difficult to change, but also, that a too high degree of heterogeneity for instance regarding unit labour costs or inflation as is the case for Italy, Portugal and Greece, imposes high costs on the concerned countries and creates political tension in the EMU.
A restrictive application of the convergence criteria (as was the case with the refusal to let Lithuania into EMU in 2006) meanwhile maximizes the potential of the European Commission and the ECB to maintain the 'top-down' reform pressure on the EMU candidate countries.
I think it would be very high time to revisit the Maastricht criteria which are not suitable for fast growing transition economies. I think it was a strategic mistake that Lithuania’s ERM bid was rejected.
The Maastricht Criteria are supposed to safeguard the stability of the euro from bad performing national economies. However, keeping Central Europe out of the system is now costlier than letting them in. The Central European economy is more integrated into the Single Market than some parts of the eurozone, and the euro becomes a shadow currency. Given the exposure of the euro zone to these countries the ECB already had to bail out non eurozone members.
I think that ‘the Czech Republic and Hungary have recently abandoned their EMU-skeptical stance’. Hungary had been always pro-euro, but the previous governments saw no slight chance to meet the ERM requirements. In fact, I think that the euro has a bigger support in these countries than in many eurozone ones.
Before talking about expanding the eurozone, shouldn’t you be looking at some of the problems it will be facing in the coming months. Let me quote:
David Smith, Economics Editor of the Sunday Times: “If there was a currency I was worried about at the moment it would be the euro. Three of its members, Greece, Italy and Spain, have had their credit ratings downgraded and Ireland is on ‘negative watch’. The European Central Bank, having started well in the crisis, is now dragging its feet and seems in a similar state of denial to the bank of Japan in the early 1990s before the ‘lost decade’. ….. Europe, if it is not careful, could be the next Japan.”
The New York Times, quoting a Greek shipping magnate: “The Italians, the Spaniards, the Greeks, we have all been living in happy land, spending what we did not have. It’s a fantasy world”.
The NYT goes on to say: “For some countries on the periphery of the 16 member euro currency zone, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain - the debt fired dream of endless consumption has turned into the rudest of nightmares, raising the risk that a euro country may be forced to declare bankruptcy or abandon the currency”.
An analyst at Lombard Street Research in London: “Adjustment in the the overvalued euro economies [Italy grossly, Spain moderately] will be much more painful and Italy’s possible exit from he euro augurs for years of crisis”.
Peter Sutherland, a former EU Commissioner and now Chairman of BP, interviewed on the BBC World Service was asked how euro currencies that needed to devalue but could not would cope with their problems snapped - and that is the right word -: “Wages will just have to come down”.
Supporting that the Irish Finance Minister, interviewed on BBC TV, admitted that cutting public sector wages was a possibilty being considered as part of the solution to Ireland’s problem.
I understand that the proposal now on the table is for a 7.5% cut in Irish public sector pay. And if you think that will only happen in Ireland, think again.
David Smith is not an authority. On anything. Period. He is a paid mouthpiece.
Sutherland is right - wages will have to come down in the public sector. Good.
Sadly for the UK, the first hit is being taken by everybody - in their pockets, as sterling slides, stops, gets set to slide again. The tories will have to deal with this in 2010.
“The New York Times, quoting a Greek shipping magnate: “The Italians, the Spaniards, the Greeks, we have all been living in happy land, spending what we did not have. It’s a fantasy world”
If there is a country living in fantasy land in this world and USA.
Soon it will be nightmareland.